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HAM SANDWICH NATION: DUE PROCESS WHEN EVERYTHING IS A
CRIME

Glenn Harlan Reynolds*
INTRODUCTION
Prosecutorial discretion poses an increasing threat to justice. The threat
has in fact grown more severe to the point of becoming a due process issue.
Two recent events have brought more attention to this problem. One involves
the decision not to charge NBC anchor David Gregory with violating gun laws.
In Washington D.C., brandishing a thirty-round magazine is illegal and can
result in a yearlong sentence. Nonetheless, the prosecutor refused to charge
Gregory despite stating that the on-air violation was clear.1 The other event
involves the government’s rather enthusiastic efforts to prosecute Reddit
founder Aaron Swartz for downloading academic journal articles from a closed
database. Authorities prosecuted Swartz so vigorously that he committed
suicide in the face of a potential fifty-year sentence.2
Both cases have aroused criticism. In Swartz’s case, a congresswoman has
even proposed legislation designed to ensure that violating a website’s terms
cannot be prosecuted as a crime.3 But the problem is much broader. Given the
*

Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. J.D., Yale
Law School, 1985. Thanks to Leigh Outten for excellent research assistance.
1.
Peter Hermann, David Gregory Won’t Be Charged, Wash. Post: Post Politics (Jan. 11,
2013, 4:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/01/11/davidgregory-wont-be-charged/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Letter from Irvin B.
Nathan, Att’y Gen. of the District of Columbia, to Lee Levine, Att’y, Levine Sullivan Koch &
Schulz, LLP (Jan. 11, 2013), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/141426869/DC-AttorneyGeneral-Letter-Declining-to-Prosecute-David-Gregory (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(declining to prosecute David Gregory).
2.
Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as Bully, Lessig Blog, v2 (Jan. 12, 2013),
http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/40347463044/prosecutor-as-bully (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
3.
The relevant legislation was introduced by Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.).
Lawrence Lessig, Aaron’s Law: Violating a Site’s Terms of Service Should Not Land You in Jail,
Atlantic (Jan. 16, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/13/01/aaronslaw/267247/# (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For criticism of the Gregory decision, see
David French, David Gregory and the Decline of the Rule of Law, Nat’l Rev. Online (Jan. 15,
2013, 10:12 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/337702/david-gregory-and-decline-rule-
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vast web of legislation and regulation that exists today, virtually any American
bears the risk of being targeted for prosecution.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Attorney General (and later Supreme Court Justice) Robert Jackson once
commented: “If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows he can
choose his defendants.”4 This method results in “[t]he most dangerous power
of the prosecutor: that he will pick people he thinks he should get, rather than
pick cases that need to be prosecuted.”5 Prosecutors could easily fall prey to
the temptation of “picking the man, and then searching the law books . . . to
pin some offense on him.”6 In short, prosecutors’ discretion to charge—or not
to charge—individuals with crimes is a tremendous power, amplified by the
large number of laws on the books.
Prosecutors themselves understand just how much discretion they enjoy.
As Tim Wu recounted in 2007, a popular game in the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Southern District of New York was to name a famous person—Mother
Teresa, or John Lennon—and decide how he or she could be prosecuted:
It would then be up to the junior prosecutors to figure out a plausible
crime for which to indict him or her. The crimes were not usually
rape, murder, or other crimes you’d see on Law & Order but rather
the incredibly broad yet obscure crimes that populate the U.S. Code
like a kind of jurisprudential minefield: Crimes like “false
statements” (a felony, up to five years), “obstructing the mails” (five
years), or “false pretenses on the high seas” (also five years). The
trick and the skill lay in finding the more obscure offenses that fit
the character of the celebrity and carried the toughest sentences.
The, result, however, was inevitable: “prison time.”7

law-david-french (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Can we even speak of the rule of law
as a meaningful concept when we combine an explosive regulatory state with near-absolute
prosecutorial discretion?”).
4.
Harvey Silverglate, Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent, at xxxvi
(2011) (quoting Justice Jackson).
5.
Id.
6.
Id; cf. Federal Offenses Series: Examining the Bloated Criminal Code, Wall St. J.:
Washington Wire (May 6, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/05/06/federaloffenses-series-examining-the-bloated-criminal-code/ (“There are more than 4,500 federal laws
and regulations on the books. Lawrence Lewis was ensnared in one of them and now has a
criminal record to show for it. All for a mistake he didn’t even know he made.”).
7.
Tim Wu, American Lawbreaking, Slate (Oct. 14, 2007, 8:03 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/features/2007/american_lawbreak
ing/introduction.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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With so many more federal laws and regulations than were present in
Jackson’s day,8 a prosecutor’s task of first choosing a possible target and then
pinning the crime on him or her has become much easier. If prosecutors were
not motivated by politics, revenge, or other improper motives, the risk of
improper prosecution would not be particularly severe. However, such
motivations do, in fact, encourage prosecutors to pursue certain individuals,
like the gadfly Aaron Swartz, while letting others off the hook—as in the case
of Gregory, a popular newscaster generally supportive of the current
administration.
This problem has been discussed at length in Gene Healy’s Go Directly to
Jail: The Criminalization of Almost Everything9 and Harvey Silverglate’s
Three Felonies a Day.10 The upshot of both books is that the proliferation of
federal criminal statutes and regulations has reached the point where virtually
every citizen, knowingly or not (usually not) is potentially at risk for
prosecution. That assertion is undoubtedly true, and the consequences are
drastic and troubling.
The result of overcriminalization is that prosecutors no longer need to
wait for obvious signs of a crime. Instead of finding Professor Plum dead in the
conservatory and launching an investigation, authorities can instead start an
investigation of Colonel Mustard as soon as someone has suggested he is a
shady character. And since, as the game Wu describes illustrates, everyone is a
criminal if prosecutors look hard enough, they are guaranteed to find
something eventually.
Overcriminalization has thus left us in a peculiar place: Though people
suspected of a crime have extensive due process rights in dealing with the
police, and people charged with a crime have even more extensive due process
rights in court, the actual decision of whether or not to charge a person with a
crime is almost completely unconstrained. Yet, because of overcharging and
plea bargains, the decision to prosecute is probably the single most important
event in the chain of criminal procedure.

8.

How many crimes are there now? Too many:
There are now more than 4,000 federal crimes, an increase of one-third since 1980.
Many of those crimes, spread out through some 27,000 pages of the U.S. Code,
incorporate violations of federal regulations that are in turn spread throughout the tens
of thousands of pages of the Code of Federal Regulations. As a result, even teams of
legal researchers—let alone ordinary citizens—cannot reliably ascertain what federal
law prohibits.
Gene Healy, Go Directly to Jail: The Criminalization of Almost Everything, at vii (2004).
9.
Id.
10.
Silverglate, supra note 4.
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II. CHECKS ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Despite the problems described above, most of us remain safe.
Prosecutors have limited resource and there are political constraints on
egregious overreaching.11 And presumably, most of the time prosecutors can
be expected to exercise their discretion soundly. Unfortunately, these
limitations on prosecutorial power are likely to be least effective where
prosecutors act inappropriately because of politics or prejudice. Limited
resources or not, a prosecutor who is anxious to go after a political enemy will
always find sufficient staff to bring charges, and political constraints are least
effective where a prosecutor is playing to public passions or hysteria.12
Once charged with a crime, defendants are in a tough position. First, they
must bear the costs of a defense, assuming they are not indigent. Second, even
if they consider themselves entirely innocent, they will face strong pressure to
accept a plea bargain—pressure made worse by the modern tendency of
prosecutors to overcharge with extensive “kitchen-sink” indictments:
Prosecutors count on the fact that when a defendant faces a hundred felony
charges, the prospect that a jury might go along with even one of them will be
enough to make a plea deal look attractive. Then, of course, there are the
reputational damages involved, which may be of greatest importance precisely
in cases where political motivations might be in play. Worse, prosecutors have
no countervailing incentives not to overcharge. A defendant who makes the
wrong choice will wind up in jail; a prosecutor who charges improperly will
suffer little, if any, adverse consequence beyond a poor win/loss record.
Prosecutors are even absolutely immune from lawsuits over misconduct in
their prosecutorial capacity.13

11.

State prosecutors are often elected and thus subject to direct political constraint. But even
federal prosecutors are subject to supervision by the Attorney General or the President, who must
take account of public reaction. After Aaron Swartz’s suicide, for example, Justice Department
officials were called to explain his prosecution before Congress. Ryan J. Reilly, DOJ to Brief
Congress on Aaron Swartz Prosecution, Huffington Post: Politics (Feb. 15, 2013, 12:12 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/15/aaron-swartz-prosecution_n_2695356.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
12.
Reportedly, Aaron Swartz was prosecuted so vigorously because of Justice Department
unhappiness with his copyright activism and “Open Access Manifesto.” Ryan J. Reilly, Aaron
Swartz Prosecutors Weighed ‘Guerilla’ Manifesto, Justice Official Tells Congressional
PM),
Committee,
Huffington
Post:
Politics
(Feb.
22,
2013,
1:28
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/22/aaron-swartz-prosecutors_n_2735675.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex.) suggested that anger over
Freedom of Information Act requests filed by Swartz may have contributed to his prosecution.
Stephen Dinan, Top Senator Scolds Holder over Reddit Founder’s Suicide, Wash. Times: Inside
Politics (Jan. 18, 2013, 12:18 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/insidepolitics/2013/jan/18/top-senator-scolds-holder-over-reddit-founders-sui/ (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
13.
See generally David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After
Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect
Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 Yale L.J. Online 203, 209–20 (2011),
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III. BETTER APPROACHES TO PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
So how to respond? Although this brief Essay cannot begin to address all
of the possibilities, it can serve as the beginning of a much-needed discussion.
As this Essay indicates, the decision to charge a person criminally should itself
undergo some degree of due process scrutiny. Short of constitutional due
process scrutiny, however, it is time to look at structural changes in the
criminal justice system that will more successfully deter prosecutorial abuse.
Traditionally, of course, the grand jury was seen as the major bar to
prosecutorial overreaching.14 The effectiveness of this approach may be seen
in the longstanding aphorism that a good prosecutor can persuade a grand jury
to indict a ham sandwich.15 Grand jury reforms—where grand juries still
exist—might encourage grand jurors to exercise more skepticism and educate
them more.16 But grand juries are not constitutionally guaranteed at the state
level, and reforming them at the federal level is likely to prove difficult.
Overall, the problem stems from a dynamic in which those charged with
crimes have a lot at risk, while those doing the charging have very little “skin
in the game.” One source of imbalance is prosecutorial immunity. The absolute
immunity of prosecutors—like the absolute immunity of judges—is a judicial
invention, a species of judicial activism that gets less attention than many other
less egregious examples. Although such immunity no doubt prevents
significant mischief, it also enables significant mischief by eliminating one
major avenue of accountability. Even a shift to qualified, good faith immunity
for prosecutors would change the calculus significantly, making subsequent
review something that is at least possible.
Another remedy might be a “loser pays” rule for criminal defense costs.
After all, when a person is charged with a crime, the defense—for which nonindigent defendants bear the cost—is an integral part of the criminal justice
process.17 For guilty defendants, one might view this cost as part of the
punishment. But for those found not guilty, it looks more like a taking: Spend
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/10/25/keenan.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing prosecutorial immunity).
14.
See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1965) (“The constitutional
requirement . . . of an indictment . . . has for its primary purpose the protection of the individual
from jeopardy except on a finding of probable cause by a group of his fellow citizens, and is
designed to afford a safeguard against oppressive actions of the prosecutor or a court.”).
15.
The phrase, made famous in Tom Wolfe’s novel, The Bonfire of the Vanities, apparently
originates with New York City federal judge Sol Wachtler in a lunchtime interview with a
reporter from the New York Daily News. Barry Popik, “Indict a ham sandwich,” Big Apple (July
15, 2004) http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/indict_a_ham_sandwich/
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
16.
Grand jurors might, for example, be given extensive training, or be given counsel and
investigators of their own.
17.
See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543–45 (2001) (stressing role of
attorneys in administration of justice).
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this money in the public interest to support a public endeavor, or go to jail.
Perhaps the prosecution could be required to pay a defendant’s legal fees if he
or she is not convicted. To further discipline the process, one could implement
a pro-rate system: Charge a defendant with twenty offenses, but convict on
only one, and the prosecution must bear 95% of the defendant’s legal fees.
This would certainly discourage overcharging.
The “nuclear option” of prosecutorial accountability would involve
banning plea bargains. An understanding that every criminal charge filed
would have to be either backed up in open court or ignominiously dropped
would significantly reduce the incentive to overcharge. It would also
drastically reduce the number of criminal convictions achieved by our justice
system. But given that America is a world leader in incarceration, it is fair to
suggest that this might be not a bug, but a feature.18 Our criminal justice
system, as presently practiced, is basically a plea bargain system with actual
trials of guilt or innocence a bit of showy froth floating on top.19
A less dramatic option might be to require that the prosecution’s plea
offers be presented to a jury or judge after a conviction, before sentencing.
Judges or jurors might then wonder why they are being asked to sentence a
defendant to twenty years without parole when the prosecution was willing to
settle for five. Fifteen years in jail seems a rather stiff punishment for making
the state undergo the bother of a trial.
It is also worth considering whether mere regulatory violations—malum
prohibitum rather than malum in se—should bear criminal sanctions at all.
Traditionally, of course, citizens have been expected to know the law. Yet
traditionally, regulatory crimes usually applied only to citizens in specialty
occupations, who might be expected to be familiar with applicable regulatory
law. Ordinary citizens needed no special knowledge to avoid committing rape,
robbery, theft, etc. But now, with the explosion of regulatory law, every citizen
is at risk of criminal prosecution for crimes that, as David Gregory’s defenders
noted,20 involve no actual harm or ill intent. Yet any reasonable observer

18.

Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. Times (Apr.
23,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht23prison.12253738.html?pagewanted=all&amp;_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
19.
See Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice: From Public Morality Play to
Hidden Plea Bargaining Machine, Volokh Conspiracy (Mar. 13, 2012, 9:22 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/03/13/the-machinery-of-criminal-justice-from-public-moralityplay-to-hidden-plea-bargaining-machine/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
transformation of legal prosecutorial system from “lay-run morality plan” to “professionalized
plea bargaining assembly line”).
20.
Howard Kurtz, David Gregory, Piers Morgan Under Assault over Guns, Daily Download
(Dec.
26,
2012),
http://daily-download.com/david-gregory-piers-morgan-assaultguns/#.UNr0lpOeoB8.twitter (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For other examples in the
same vein, see Katie Glueck, Media Disdain for the David Gregory Story, Politico (Dec. 26,
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would have to conclude that actual knowledge of all applicable criminal laws
and regulations is impossible, especially when those regulations frequently
depart from any intuitive sense of what “ought” to be legal or illegal. Perhaps
placing citizens at risk in this regard constitutes a due process violation;
expecting people to do (or know) the impossible certainly sounds like one.
Support for this notion comes from Court of Appeals Judge John R.
Brown, who wrote, in a 1965 case holding that a prosecutor could refuse to
sign a grand jury’s indictment, that such a refusal was justified by the
complexities of modern criminal law:
Putting aside these factors which bear on the delicate nature of
governmental decisions, there are technical reasons indigenous to
criminal law which are equally compelling. Federal crimes are more
and more for violation of highly complex statutes. Federal
jurisdiction, indeed, whether the activity constitutes a federal crime,
depend on intricate facts, many beyond the knowledge and
experience of laymen composing the Grand Jury.21
This naked admission that federal criminal law is so complex that a grand
jury cannot be expected to understand it carries two lessons: First, it seems
optimistic to expect grand juries to provide an adequate check on prosecutorial
overreaching; and second, if a federal grand jury cannot be expected to
understand the complexities of federal criminal law, it seems utterly absurd to
maintain the fiction that ordinary citizens should be presumed to know the law.
That being the case, it seems to me that the problem here is a real one. If
we care about due process—and we should—we should be deeply concerned
about a system in which official discretion reigns almost unfettered where
constraint matters most.

_______________________________________________________________
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2012, 10:44 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/12/disdain-for-the-david-gregorystory-152840.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
21.
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 182–85 (5th Cir. 1965) (Brown, J., concurring).
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